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ABSTRACT 
This thesis compares two contending political science theories about why 
presidents use their unilateral authority as I investigate whether President Obama acted as 
an entrepreneurial president or a particularistic president when awarding grants to states 
through the Race to the Top competition. To do so, I evaluate the 12 winning states in 
two areas. First, I analyze how each of the states ranked nationally in the Editorial 
Projects in Education Quality Counts Report 2009 and then determine whether each of 
the winning states needed education reform policies. If so, then it is likely the Obama 
Administration was acting in a manner consistent with the entrepreneurial presidency 
model to advance their education policy agenda. Then I examine how each of the 
winning states voted in the 2008 election to determine which of those states would be the 
most competitive in the 2012 election. If I found that the winning state was also a swing 
state, then it is likely the Obama Administration was acting in a manner consistent with 
the particularistic presidency model to gain electoral support through grant allocation. My 
results indicate that the Obama Administration’s Race to the Top grant decisions are most 
consistent with the entrepreneurial presidency model, thereby advancing his education 
policy agenda outside of legislative action.
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INTRODUCTION 
What explains unilateral decision-making by a president? The power of the 
president to use unilateral action has been claimed since George Washington. In much of 
the history of the presidency, most unilateral actions have been for administrative 
purposes. In the last 50 years, however, the construct of unilateral decision-making has 
shifted toward decisions that affect the national political process. Political scientists 
studying this change in the modern presidency have posed theories about why presidents 
have made this change. 
Presidency scholars have taken note of what motivates the president, and based on 
those motivations, what they might do in the future. John Hudak (2014) and Douglas 
Kriner and Andrew Reeves (2015a) developed the theory of presidential particularism 
that expands on the idea that presidents are motivated by politics. These scholars argue 
presidents use their unilateral authority to benefit their own electoral motives or the 
electoral needs of other people in their party. William Howell (2013), on the other hand, 
expands on what is called presidential entrepreneurialism, which contends that presidents 
use their unilateral authority to advance their policy agenda. Presidents pursue a series of 
goals during their presidency, including good public policy, expanded institutional 
power, and enhanced presidential legacy (Moe and Howell 1999; Neustadt 1960). 
However, before any of those goals can be pursued, presidents must have electoral 
success (Hudak, 2011, 8). Additionally, Hudak writes that “beyond the obvious benefits 
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of an individual’s initial election to the office of president, reelection allows the president 
the most immediate and continued influence over public policy” (Hudak, 2011). 
In this thesis, I examine the Obama Administration’s decision-making concerning 
the Race to the Top (RTTT) Initiative to test these two competing theories. I ask whether 
the Obama Administration awarded federal grants to advance its education policy agenda 
or to states that would have the most electoral benefit. Based on evidence presented by 
Hudak, the two theories do not work in tandem, because without re-election, policy 
objectives cannot be met. According to Howell, a president can make innovative policy 
decisions simply to advance his agenda. Examining the RTTT winners will allow me to 
determine if one, both or neither of the theories apply to the innovative grant program 
developed by the Obama Administration.
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UNILATERAL ACTION AND RACE TO THE TOP 
In February 2009, President Obama signed the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) into law, which designated a $4.35 billion “executive 
earmark” for the U.S. Department of Education (USDOE). An executive earmark allows 
the president to direct funds to a specific recipient while circumventing the merit-based 
or competitive funds allocation process at spending is allocated. Obama used his 
executive authority to earmark funds for the Race to the Top (RTTT) program. To 
understand the forces that drove President Obama’s decision-making concerning which 
states to award RTTT funds, I apply two unilateral authority theories. Douglas L. Kriner 
and Andrew Reeves (2012) and John Hudak (2014) claim the president uses the power of 
federal grant allocation to further their political goals. William Howell (2013), however, 
theorizes that a president will use this unilateral action to advance their policy agenda 
when Congress is unable or unwilling to cooperate. 
Kriner and Reeves (2012, 2014, 2015) pose the question of whether voters reward 
presidents for federal spending at the local level. In a study of presidential elections from 
1988 to 2008, evidence suggests that voters reward incumbent presidents (or their party’s 
nominee) for increased federal spending in local communities. They argue that presidents 
possess strong electoral and partisan incentives to pursue policies that prioritize the needs 
of some Americans over those of others. According to Hudak, executive earmarks are 
one way to accomplish that electoral goal. In his book, Presidential Pork: White House 
Influence over the Distribution of Federal Grants, Hudak details how presidents from 
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both parties have used federal funds for political and electoral purposes. “In the wake of 
the congressional earmark ban—no matter how porous its constraints—the executive 
branch has been empowered to dole out even more federal funding than ever before” 
(Hudak, 2014). Kriner, Reeves and Hudak assert that these presidents are acting in a 
particularistic manner by directing federal dollars to specific constituents for political 
gain (Kriner & Reeves, 2014; Hudak, 2014). 
Conversely, William Howell (2013) argues that presidents use their various forms 
of unilateral authority in ways that suit their policy interests, rather than their political 
goals. For example, President Obama had to use the institutional powers granted to the 
office of the president to fulfill his domestic policy promises to the American people 
(Howell, 2013). Presidents face extraordinary public expectations to change policy yet 
have very little constitutional authority to do so. Despite this, presidents, have historically 
created many mechanisms to advance their policy objectives (Howell, 2013). 
Although Obama campaigned mightily to repeal the No Child Left Behind Act 
(NCLB) of 2002, he failed to garner majority support in Congress to take swift action 
once elected. Having been elected on the promise of change, Obama was forced to push 
the boundaries of his office in order to accomplish his agenda. In addition to rewriting 
certain provisions of the NCLB, he hoped to expand K-12 education to include college 
and career readiness and create strong pre-school education in every state. Without the 
cooperation of Congress to expediently pass new education legislation, the Obama 
Administration used their capacity to allocate federal dollars to develop the RTTT 
competition. As part of the application process, RTTT required states to adopt policies in 
line with the Obama agenda to win federal grant money. The design of the RTTT 
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competition makes it an ideal mechanism to evaluate why presidents use their unilateral 
authority. In this study, I seek to determine, through RTTT, whether Barack Obama was 
motivated by the desire to advance his political aspirations and that of the Democratic 
party or if he used his unilateral authority to establish his education policy. 
Looking at these competing theories, side by side, will provide us greater insight 
into presidential politics and how unilateral authority is used. I may find that President 
Obama had both political and policy motivations for RTTT or I may find that neither of 
these theories applies. To further understand the environment that made RTTT possible, 
it is important to know the context of RTTT and what makes it unique.
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CONTEXTUALIZING RACE TO THE TOP 
In February 2009, Congress signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009, which granted $787 billion in tax cuts and stimulated the economy by 
saving existing jobs, and creating new ones, and providing temporary relief for programs 
most effected by the recession. In addition, the ARRA set aside nearly $100 billion for 
education. Approximately $48.5 billion of ARRA education funding was allocated for the 
State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) to help states recover from budget shortfalls and 
prevent teacher layoffs, $5 billion of which was intended to be leveraged by states to 
implement innovative education reforms (Burke, 2010). 
The SFSF required states to show progress in four reform areas previously 
authorized under the bipartisan Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the 
America Competes Act of 2007. State education systems receiving SFSF funds had to 
make significant progress toward rigorous college and career readiness standards and 
high-quality assessments that were valid and reliable for all students, including English 
language learners and students with disabilities; schools had to establish pre-K to college 
and career data systems to track progress and foster continuous improvement; schools 
had to make significant improvements in teacher effectiveness and provide intensive 
support; and create effective intervention programs for the lowest-performing schools 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
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The Race to the Top Fund 
As part of the SFSF, the Obama Administration created the RTTT competition to 
award $4.35 billion to states based on education policy reforms that had already been 
enacted or to states that had a comprehensive plan to adopt new reforms (Howell, 2013). 
RTTT was tailored after the requirements of the SFSF but focused on the policy priorities 
of the Obama Administration. Unlike RTTT, the SFSF grants focused on the prior 
success of schools to raise student achievement, equitable distribution of teachers, the 
strength of their longitudinal databases, how well they had improved standards and 
assessments, how well the state supported struggling schools, and the quality of their plan 
for continued progress in those areas (Whitehurst, 2010). 
RTTT was designed to be a nationwide competition open to all 50 states, the 
District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The initiative was designed 
to address the major flaws with NCLB and was intended to award federal funds based on 
four core education reform areas:  1) states had to adopt standards and assessments that 
prepared students for success in college and the workplace, and to compete in the global 
economy; 2) states were required to build data systems that measured student growth and 
success; 3) states had to recruit, develop, reward, and retain effective teachers and 
principals, especially in school districts with the most need; and 4) states were required to 
turn around the lowest-achieving schools (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
According to Joseph P. Viteritti, the Thomas Hunter Professor of Public Policy at Hunter 
College, CUNY, creating the policy criteria was the federal government using its power 
and resources to move the country toward national standards designed collectively by the 
8 
 
 
states, rather than forcing states to follow federal standards coming from Washington 
(Viteritti, 2012). 
States were required to submit a comprehensive application to the USDOE, 
detailing current policies and plans to implement policies that aligned with the criteria of 
RTTT and the Obama Administration. The applications would be scored based in six core 
areas that included state success factors, standards and assessments, data systems to 
support instruction, great teachers and leaders, turning around the lowest achieving 
schools and state local education agency participation. Daniel H. Bowen of the American 
Enterprise Institute, raised concerns about the objectivity of the scoring process of RTTT. 
Bowen was concerned that the scoring assumed that the application process started with a 
level playing field. The 2010 Economic Stimulus Watch report states that political 
influences are possible because of the ambiguous scoring rubric. He wrote that effective 
rubrics establish methods for measuring the extent to which the criteria are met. The 
RTTT rubric failed to provide objective methods for measuring how well the criteria 
were met by each state which left significant room for discretion by the reviewers 
(Bowen, 2010). These reviewers had expertise in education policy, education reform, 
operational and organizational management, and experience with application review and 
evaluation (U.S. Department of Education, 2009) but the rubric itself may have made it 
impossible for subjectivity. (See Appendix A for a breakdown of Phases 1 and 2 scoring). 
Once the evaluations were competed, the states with the top scores would be 
awarded grants. In phase one the grants were based on need and in phase two were based 
on the state’s population. States like New York and California could be awarded up to 
$700 million, while the smallest states like Idaho and New Hampshire were eligible for 
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awards up to $75 million. The USDOE determined the actual size of the award based on 
state budget requests, the level of local education agency (LEA) participation, and the 
proposed activities (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
For the Obama Administration, RTTT was an innovative way to provide incentive 
for state and local leaders to work together on ambitious reforms, and develop plans to 
change policies and practices to improve outcomes for students without moving 
comprehensive education reform through Congress. Although RTTT was a unique way of 
distributing funds under the SFSF by the Obama Administration, the phenomenon of a 
president using executive action to create policy is not. We do not know what motivated 
President Obama to create RTTT, however the political science research on executive 
unilateral action has evolved to the point that there are theories for why presidents use 
their unilateral authority in certain situations. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many scholars have looked at what modern presidents do to influence policy. 
Early research focused on the skills, temperament and experience of a president rather 
than the formal authority given to the president. In his 1960 book, Presidential Power 
and the Modern Presidents, Richard Neustadt argues that in a government with separate 
institutions sharing powers the chief power of the president is the power to persuade. He 
claims that if the president has to resort to his formal powers to achieve his objectives, he 
has already failed and is likely to pay a high price that will further undermine his 
persuasive capital in future endeavors. "The essence of a President's persuasive task, with 
congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them 
is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their 
interest, not his" (Neustadt, 1960, 40). In practice, the use of unilateral authority requires 
a president to secure the cooperation of other political actors through persuasive tactics. 
Neustadt’s ideas dominated the study of presidential power for decades.  
Neustadt’s ideas established that the behavior of the president reigned supreme. 
Subsequent scholars suggest that skill, personality, style, and reputation are components 
for presidential power (Barber, 1972; George, 1974; Greenstein, 2000).  Power was 
contingent on persuasion and the power to persuade rests in the personal qualities of a 
president. Post-Neustadt scholars contend that unilateral authority allows presidents to act 
alone and more efficiently than Congress (Deering and Maltzman, 1999; Krause and 
Cohen, 1997, 462). Moe and Scott Wilson (1994, 13) contend that the presidential 
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strategy of going public to get the support of the electorate is a strategic way that allows 
them to maneuver the system to get their desired outcome. Described by other scholars as 
the “strategic model,” presidents are strategic actors, who issue unilateral orders to 
bypass or evade Congress (Fine and Warber, 2012; Morgan, 1970; Nathan, 1983). 
Scholarly research of Presidency studies shifted in the 1980s and 1990s to a very 
different perspective. In two important essays, Terry Moe (1985, 1993) urged scholars to 
shift attention from analyses of presidential strategy and style within fixed constraints to 
studies of how presidents factor into the broader “logic of institutional development” 
(1985, 236). This was at odds with Neustadt’s view of the weak president. 
Moe and William G. Howell (1999), together, offer an institutional theory of 
presidential power. They conclude that the “president’s powers of unilateral action are a 
force of American politics because they are not specified in the formal structure of 
government” (Moe and Howell 1999, 852). Most institutional theorists look at the formal 
powers given to the institution, while Moe and Howell (1999) look specifically at the 
powers given to the president that are not a formal structure of government. They contend 
that presidents will push the envelope, while at the same time, use their unilateral powers 
strategically and with moderation. This expanded power of the president is a way to 
rescue the nation from congressional inactivity. When the president uses unilateral action 
to alter the status quo, it forces Congress to act or acquiesce to the new presidentially-
made law (Moe and Howell, 1999). 
Presidents historically have fashioned all sorts of mechanisms by which to 
advance their policy objectives: through unilateral directives such as executive orders, 
proclamations, and national security directives, all of which have received a good 
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measure of scholarly attention (Howell, 2005 and Mayer, 2009); but also through signing 
statements (Jackman, 2014; Kelly, Marshall, and Watts, 2013; Thrower, 2013), executive 
agreements (Martin, 2000), memoranda (Woolley, 2014), procurement provisions 
(Gitterman, 2013), and distributive policies (Berry, Burden, and Howell, 2010; Kriner 
and Reeves, 2015; Hudak, 2014). Presidents have either discovered or manufactured 
ways to shape public policy outside of the traditional legislative process using these 
unilateral devices. There is also literature that suggests presidents have increasingly 
adapted unilateral tools to achieve their policy and political ends (Cooper, 2002; Howell, 
2003; Mayer, 2001; Rudalevige, 2005). 
In this paper, I compare two conflicting theories about why presidents make 
policy through their own administrative devices. Douglas Kriner and Andrew Reeves 
contend that a president will use their power of unilateral decision-making to maximize 
their prospects of reelection and will respond disproportionately to the interests of 
Americans in constituencies with the most influence in the next presidential contest 
(Kriner and Reeves, 2015a). Northwestern University Law Professor Jide Nzelibe wrote 
“One of the most widespread contemporary assumptions in the discourse about the 
separation of powers is that while the president tends to have preferences that are more 
national and stable in nature, Congress is perpetually prone to parochial concerns” (2006, 
1217). Cronin and Genovese (2004, 198) argues that presidents are not supposed to act 
with their eyes on the next election or favor any group or party because they represent the 
nation in national matters. Kriner and Reeves agree that the universalistic framework 
emphasizes the difference between presidents and legislators, however, it does not fully 
explain presidential behavior. They argue that presidents face strong incentives to be 
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particularistic: which means “a president will prioritize the needs and desires of some 
citizens over others when pursuing their policy agendas” (Kriner and Reeves, 2015a, 
155). 
Particularistic presidents will geographically target federal dollars, often in order 
to assist in their reelection efforts. According to the particularistic theory, “presidents 
have incentives to respond disproportionately to the interests of Americans, in 
constituencies with the most influence, in the next presidential election” (Kriner and 
Reeves, 2015a, 156). These are often the battleground states like Virginia and Florida. 
The president often has the power to influence the geographic allocation of 
federal grants to serve their political needs. Although Congress has the power of the 
purse and determines the amount of money allocated to a specific department or agency, 
the President often uses this capacity to shape how those federal dollars are allocated 
after they are appropriated. One of the ways that a president can do this is through the 
budgetary process. The president has direct involvement in shaping precisely where and 
how federal dollars are spent. The 1921 Budget and Accounting Act gave the President 
the responsibility to present Congress with the annual budget. Presidents use this power 
to shape policy implementation. Presidents have multiple opportunities to shape 
budgetary outcomes at both the proposal and implementation stages (Berry, Burden, and 
Howell, 2010). 
For example, Kriner and Reeves use disaster declarations and military base 
closures to illustrate that this particularistic, unilateral power has both electoral and 
partisan implications that influence presidential actions about national security and the 
geographic distribution of federal resources. This work demonstrates that the President, 
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like members of Congress, has a dual role: national leader and partisan leader. As 
partisan in chief, presidents have an incentive to make policy decisions that 
systematically channel federal dollars disproportionately to parts of the country that form 
their partisan base (Kriner and Reeves 2015, 685). 
Kriner and Reeves contend that the theory of presidential particularism has 
substantial influence over the disaster declaration process. According to their research, 
counties in core states (states that supported the president) and counties in swing states 
(states that are not necessarily partisan) were more likely to receive disaster declarations 
than counties in other states. This was also more evident in election years. The 
universalistic approach contends that a president will issue disaster relief aid based on 
need. The particularistic view asserts a president will look past need and award disaster 
funding based on the electorate. In 2012, the Obama administration awarded disaster 
declarations to counties in core states 4.7 times more often than non-core states and 3.7 
times more often in swing states than non-swing states during that election year (Kriner 
and Reeves 2015, 690). 
Kriner and Reeves also look at the unilateral authority of the president over 
military base closures. Since the 1960’s, there has been controversy over the base closure 
authority of the president. It often appears that there is political motivation behind the 
closures rather than an interest in national security. To keep the president from making 
base closures based on politics, Congress passed a law in 1976, stripping the president of 
the unilateral power to close military bases. However, with the destruction of the Berlin 
Wall, Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense under George H.W. Bush, believed that base 
closures were necessary in a post-cold war world, and that the Commander in Chief had 
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authority to make that decision. Under the direction of the president, the Department of 
Defense presented Congress with a list of 35 base closures, 29 of which were in districts 
strongly represented by Democrats (Kriner and Reeves 2015, 692). Most of the bases in 
states that supported the president were not included in the list of closures. This is an 
example of how, in matters of the distributive politics of national security, the 
Commander in Chief prioritizes the needs of some Americans over those of others 
(Kriner and Reeves 2015, 698). 
John Hudak also offered the presidential particularism argument. In his book, 
Presidential Pork, Hudak argues that the President has the incentive to use the power of 
their office to advance their electoral interest. Hudak also focuses his research on the 
distributive policies of the president. According to Hudak, the structure of the Electoral 
College makes some states more important than others, therefore, persuading the median 
voter in every state would be a waste of time and resources for a president, especially in 
non-competitive states (Hudak 2014, 26). Hudak uses the example of California, which is 
traditionally considered “blue” and will not likely change to a “red” state under most 
conditions, rendering it pointless to spend time, money and influence on a state that 
theoretically does not matter (Hudak, 2014). 
Not all states are as ideologically entrenched as California, making it necessary 
for the president to strategically target the electorate in competitive states. The 
importance of these presidential electoral interests is critical to understanding why 
presidents act in a particular way. The particularistic theory that a president has electoral 
motives in the distribution of federal funds is central to Hudak’s research on presidential 
pork. To explain his theory, Hudak looks at the “pork barrel politics” that happens at the 
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presidential level. More specifically he explores the $300 million alternative energy 
grants that come from the Power Plan Improvement Initiative and the Clean Coal 
Initiative, and how they are distributed. President George W. Bush promoted these 
programs as the country demanded more clean energy, however, he did not distribute the 
funds equally across states or to all constituencies who were making strides toward clean 
energy consumption. Instead, as the election day approached, the Bush Administration 
announced that they would award grants to the five most electorally competitive states in 
recent history (Hudak 2014, 32). Ohio, New Mexico, Florida, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin were chosen to receive most the grant money allocated for the program. 
However, some smaller awards were granted to other states. The politically competitive 
states received multi-million dollar grants, large public announcement ceremonies, and a 
visit from the president or Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham, just before the 2004 
election. Florida, Ohio, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin account for 62.4% of 
George W. Bush’s television advertising for the 2004 campaign, despite those states only 
making up 16.6% of the nation’s population (Hudak, 2014, 33). 
Clearly, the use of unilateral authority by the president provides the perfect 
opportunity to behave in electorally strategic ways. Douglas Kriner, Andrew Reeves, and 
John Hudak all agree that presidents are electorally motivated and regardless of the 
circumstance will make decisions to benefit their political advancement or that of their 
down ballot cohorts. Accordingly, I base my first hypothesis upon this logic.  
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Hypothesis 1: President Obama will award grant money from RTTT to states that 
will advance his presidency. This will affirm the particularist argument developed by 
Kriner, Reeves, and Hudak, when using his unilateral authority in distributive policies. 
 
 However, the use of unilateral action by a president to influence voting behavior 
is not the only way scholars look at why presidents make use of the unilateral tools at 
their disposal. Other presidency scholars contend that presidents have policy agendas and 
will act both with and without the support of Congress. In his 2014 State of the Union 
Address, President Obama said “Wherever and whenever, I can take steps, without 
legislation to expand more opportunity for more American families, that is what I am 
going to do” (Obama, 2014). 
Matthew Dickinson and Jesse Gubb (2016) examine unilateral actions of the 
president and contend that presidents are not signing executive actions to bypass 
Congress but rather to put down an initial policy marker while waiting for eventual 
congressional action. Their research agrees with Moe and Howell (1999), concluding that 
presidents are more likely to utilize policy-related executive orders when Congress is less 
likely to produce legislation (Dickinson and Gubb, 2016). However, they assert that 
presidents are strategic in the way they use the various policy making mechanisms. For 
example, George W. Bush, signed executive order to establish the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and simultaneously introduced bills in Congress to put the 
department on solid footing (Dickinson and Gubb, 2016).  In this example, Bush believed 
that establishing the DHS could not wait for the lengthy Congressional approval process. 
By using his unilateral power of executive order, he established the department and then 
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allowed Congress to make it a cabinet-level agency. This is often the role that executive 
orders play in the legislative process. 
The conclusions reached by Dickinson and Gubb are consistent with a broader 
theoretical argument offered by William Howell.  Given the ambiguity of Article II of the 
Constitution, Howell writes that the president has the ability to be the most 
entrepreneurial in their efforts to establish policy. Indeed, among political actors, 
presidents may hold the prize for being the most entrepreneurial (Howell, 2014). 
Presidents face extraordinary public expectations and yet have little constitutional 
authority. “Presidents historically have fashioned all sorts of mechanisms by which to 
advance their policy objectives: through unilateral directives such as executive orders, 
proclamations, and national security directives, all of which have received a good 
measure of scholarly attention” (Howell 2014, 1) 
In his book, Thinking about the Presidency: The Primacy of Power, Howell 
(2013) writes that we see signs of presidential entrepreneurialism at every turn. Modern 
presidents create new policy devices over which they can exert nearly complete control, 
and in others reorganize the federal bureaucracy in ways that better suit their policy 
interests. For example, while Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign focused on “hope” and 
“change” when he was elected, his agenda faced great opposition. In order to deliver on 
his promises, Obama had to use the institutional powers granted to his office (Howell, 
2015). The ability of a president to promote a policy agenda through unilateral action was 
common practice during the Obama administration. For example, President Obama 
signed an executive order raising the minimum wage of federal workers when Congress 
failed to enact legislation that would accomplish this goal. Obama was only able to exert 
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this unilateral authority over an agency under his control. He called on mayors, 
governors, and state legislators, hoping that this federal policy change would ignite other 
state and local municipalities to raise the minimum for all workers. 
During a time of divisive government, presidents will exercise their unilateral 
authority when Congress cannot or will not adopt the policies of the president. In his 
theory of presidential entrepreneurialism, Howell postulates that presidents will use their 
unilateral authority to advance their policy agenda in entrepreneurial ways (Howell, 
2015). Accordingly, I base my second hypothesis upon this logic. 
 
Hypothesis 2: President Obama will award grant money from RTTT to states 
with the most need for education policy reform. This will affirm Howell’s argument that 
the president will be entrepreneurial when using their unilateral authority to establish 
policy. 
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METHODOLGY 
To assess whether the Obama Administration used the RTTT grants as an 
entrepreneurial policy making tool or as a way to channel federal dollars to key 
constituencies for electoral benefit, I will examine the winners of the first two phases of 
the RTTT program. For each of the winning states I will evaluate both their educational 
ranking and political context, to test each state against my hypothesis. 
 I first look at state education data to determine how each of the winning states 
rank nationally and, among the 12 RTTT winners. I use data from the Editorial Projects 
in Education (EPE) Research Center’s Quality Counts Report 2009 to evaluate the overall 
score, from the six key indicators, that help determine the success of students in K-12 
schools. The EPE Quality Counts report has been published annually since 1997 to track 
state education policies and outcomes which draws on the EPE annual state policy 
survey. The key indicators in the report are aligned with the policy objectives of the 
Obama Administration and include: the state’s chance for success; K-12 achievement; 
standards, assessments & accountability; transitions & alignment; teaching profession; 
and school finance1. I use this data to evaluate whether the presidential 
entrepreneurialism theory applies to the RTTT awards. If Howell’s theory applies, the 
Obama Administration would award states with the greatest need for education reform 
policies to improve education. I elected to focus on a state’s need for education reform 
                                                 
1 A detailed report with the individual factors for each of the six indicators can be found at 
http://www.edweek.org/apps/qc2009/state_compare.html?intc=ml#table_1 
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based on the June 22, 2009 speech by U.S. Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, 
articulating that their focus would be to turn around the bottom 5% of schools (USDOE, 
2009). For this research, I define states with the most need as those states that score less 
than 80% in the overall state score. In analyzing the EPE Quality Counts Report, it was 
apparent that most of the schools that fell below 80%, in the overall score, often had 
policy areas with a D or F in one or more categories. Only 2 states that scored above an 
80% had a D or F. Georgia received a D+ in K-12 achievement and received a failing 
grade in K-12 achievement. 
I then look at the political context of each winning state, this will allow me to 
determine what, if any, electoral benefit could be derived from granting a particular state 
federal education dollars. To better understand electoral competitiveness, I classify each 
state in one of three political contexts: core state, swing state, and lost cause state (Hudak, 
2014, 34). Core states are defined as states where more than 55% of the electorate voted 
for Barack Obama and are likely to support him in the 2012 election. Lost cause states 
are those states that John McCain received more than 55% of the vote in 2008, and are 
likely to vote for Obama’s opponent in 2012. Swing states are those states that were 
decided by fewer than 10 percentage points and are likely to be the most targeted by the 
Obama administration for the 2012 election. Following the theory put forth separately by 
Douglas Kriner, Andrew Reeves, and John Hudak that presidents seek electoral motives 
in the distribution of federal funds (Kriner and Reeves, 2015a; Hudak, 2014), an 
individual state would be awarded RTTT funds based on whether a particular state would 
be a wise electoral investment. For the particularistic theory to apply, the Obama 
Administration would award RTTT grants to only swing states because they would 
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provide the most electoral benefit in the 2012 election. It is possible that the president 
could have rewarded states an RTTT grant for their electoral support in the 2008 election, 
however, that would be more difficult to quantify, so I elected to exclude it from my 
research. 
In this analysis, I am concerned with why President Obama chose certain states 
for the distribution of federal grant money in the RTTT Competition. By evaluating the 
winning states based on their overall need for education reform and whether awarding a 
grant would provide electoral benefit in the 2012 election, I will be able to determine if 
President Obama utilized the entrepreneurialism theory or particularism theory to award 
RTTT grants. 
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Table 1: Quality Counts Data 
 
State Grade Score
Chance 
for 
Success
Transition
s and 
Alignment
School 
Finance
K-12 
Achievement
Standards, 
Assessments 
and 
Accountability
Teaching 
Profession
1 Maryland B 84.7 B+ A B B B C-
2 Massachusetts B 84.6 A- C B B A- C
3 New York B 84.1 B B+ B+ C- A- C+
4 Virginia B 83.2 B B- B- C A B-
5 New Jersey B- 81.9 A- C+ B+ B- B- C
6 Ohio B- 81.2 B- B- B- C- A C+
7 Pennsylvania B- 80.3 B B- B- C+ C+ C+
8 Georgia B- 80 C B C+ D+ A- B
9 West Virginia B- 80 C- A A F A C+
10 Arkansas B- 79.6 C- B C D+ B+ B+
11 Florida B- 79.6 C+ C+ C- C A- B
12 Vermont B- 79.5 B+ C- C- C+ B- C-
13 Indiana C+ 79 C+ C+ C+ C- A- C-
14 South Carolina C+ 78.9 C C C D A A-
15 Wisconsin C+ 78 B C- C- C- C+ C+
16 Michigan C+ 77.8 C+ B B- D A- D+
17 Maine C+ 77.7 B- B- B+ C C+ D
18 Delaware C+ 77.4 B- D B- C- B+ C+
19 Texas C+ 77.1 C B B C B+ C
20 Connecticut C+ 77 A- C- B+ D C C-
21 Tennessee C+ 77 C- B+ B+ D+ A- C
22 New Mexico C+ 76.9 D+ A C D- A- C+
23 Iowa C 76.3 B C+ C C- D+ B-
24 Minnesota C 76.2 B+ C C+ C C D+
25 California C 76.1 C B- C D+ A- C-
26 Oklahoma C 76.1 C- C+ C+ D A- B-
27 Kentucky C 76 C C C+ D+ B+ B-
28 Rhode Island C 76 B- C- A- D B+ D
29 New Hampshire C 75.9 A- C- B- C C D
30 North Carolina C 75.5 C+ D+ D+ D+ A- B
31 Alabama C 75.4 C- C+ C- F A- B-
32 Washington C 75.2 B- C C C- B- C
33 Hawaii C 75.1 C+ C D B- C+
34 Louisiana C 74.4 D+ C D D- A- B
35 Wyoming C 74.4 B- D D C- C+ D-
36 North Dakota C 73.7 B D+ D+ C C D+
37 Colorado C 73.6 B D C C- B- D+
38 Kansas C 73.3 B D- C+ C C+ D+
39 Utah C 73.3 B- C- C- C- C+ C-
40 Alaska C 73.2 C C- B- D+ B D-
41 Illinois C 72.9 B- D+ C- D+ C+ D+
42 Missouri C- 72.4 C+ D+ C D C C
43 Arizona C- 72.2 C- C- D+ D+ A- D+
44 Oregon C- 71.5 C C+ C+ D C+ F
45 Montana C- 71.2 C+ D C C- C D+
46 South Dakota C- 71.1 B- D- D- C- C+ D
47 Nebraska C- 69.8 B F C+ D+ D D+
48 Mississippi D+ 69.4 D+ C D+ F B D
49 Idaho D+ 69.1 C+ D- D C- C D
50 Nevada D+ 68.8 D+ D- D D- C+ C-
51 DC D+ 68.3 C+ D+ F C+ D-
Source: Editorials in Education Quality Counts Report 2009
Phase 1 Winners Phase 2 Winners
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Table 2: 2008 Election Data 
 
State
2008 
Presidential 
Election 
Winner
% of 
Vote
% to 
loser Diff Core Swing
Lost 
Cause
Alabama McCain 60.32% 38.74% 21.58% X
Alaska McCain 59.42% 37.89% 21.53% X
Arizona McCain 53.64% 45.12% 8.52% X
Arkansas McCain 58.72% 38.86% 19.86% X
California Obama 61.01% 36.95% 24.06% X
Colorado Obama 53.66% 44.71% 8.95% X
Connecticut Obama 60.59% 38.22% 22.37% X
DC Obama 92.46% 6.53% 85.93% X
Delaware Obama 61.94% 36.95% 24.99% X
Florida Obama 51.03% 48.22% 2.81% X
Georgia McCain 52.20% 46.99% 5.21% X
Hawaii Obama 71.85% 26.58% 45.27% X
Idaho McCain 61.52% 36.09% 25.43% X
Illinois Obama 61.92% 36.78% 25.14% X
Indiana Obama 49.95% 48.91% 1.04% X
Iowa Obama 53.93% 44.39% 9.54% X
Kansas McCain 56.61% 41.65% 14.96% X
Kentucky McCain 57.40% 41.17% 16.23% X
Louisiana McCain 58.56% 39.93% 18.63% X
Maine Obama 57.71% 40.38% 17.33% X
Maryland Obama 61.92% 36.47% 25.45% X
Massachusetts Obama 61.80% 35.99% 25.81% X
Michigan Obama 57.43% 40.96% 16.47% X
Minnesota Obama 54.06% 43.82% 10.24% X
Mississippi McCain 56.18% 43.00% 13.18% X
Missouri McCain 49.43% 49.29% 0.14% X
Montana McCain 49.51% 47.25% 2.26% X
Nebraska McCain 56.53% 41.60% 14.93% X
Nevada Obama 55.15% 42.65% 12.50% X
New Hampshire Obama 54.13% 44.52% 9.61% X
New Jersey Obama 57.27% 41.70% 15.57% X
New Mexico Obama 56.91% 41.78% 15.13% X
New York Obama 62.88% 36.03% 26.85% X
North Carolina Obama 49.70% 49.38% 0.32% X
North Dakota McCain 53.25% 44.62% 8.63% X
Ohio Obama 51.50% 46.91% 4.59% X
Oklahoma McCain 65.65% 34.35% 31.30% X
Oregon Obama 56.75% 40.40% 16.35% X
Pennsylvania Obama 54.49% 44.17% 10.32% X
Rhode Island Obama 62.86% 35.06% 27.80% X
South Carolina McCain 53.87% 44.90% 8.97% X
South Dakota McCain 53.16% 44.75% 8.41% X
Tennessee McCain 56.90% 41.83% 15.07% X
Texas McCain 55.45% 43.68% 11.77% X
Utah McCain 62.58% 34.41% 28.17% X
Vermont Obama 67.46% 30.45% 37.01% X
Virginia Obama 52.63% 46.33% 6.30% X
Washington Obama 57.65% 40.48% 17.17% X
West Virginia McCain 55.71% 42.59% 13.12% X
Wisconsin Obama 56.22% 42.31% 13.91% X
Wyoming McCain 64.78% 32.54% 32.24% X
Source:  Federal Elections Commission (2008)
Phase 1 Winners Phase 2 Winners
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ANALYSIS 
The RTTT competition caused many states to scramble in order to better position 
themselves to win a piece of the $4.35 billion that the Department of Education was 
planning to award states that could prove that they would be able to meet the high 
standards that the Obama Administration had set for the grant funding. Of the 46 states 
and the District of Columbia that applied for federal grant money, 12 states were awarded 
funds in phases one and two.2  Delaware and Tennessee were the only phase one3 
winners, while the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Ohio and Rhode Island received awards in 
Phase 2 of the competition4. 
Phase One 
Delaware 
The highest scoring participant in phase one of Race to the Top was Delaware. 
Prior to entering RTTT, education had been a top policy priority for over a decade in 
Delaware. In 2006, a coalition of education, government, business, and civic leaders 
formed the Vision Coalition to improve public education in Delaware and move them out 
of the middle of the pack in the national education ranking. Their program, Vision 2015, 
                                                 
2 An additional 7 states were awarded Early Childhood Education grants in Phase 3. This was awarded with 
a completely different set of guidelines and therefore, I did not use that phase of the program in my 
analysis. 
3 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming all applied for Phase 1 but failed to adequately meet the criteria of the 
Obama Administration for funding. 
4 7 states did not reapply for consideration (Idaho, Minnesota, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Wyoming) while Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, and Washington submitted 
first time applications in Phase 2. 
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had 6 major elements to reform their education system. Their goals were to invest in early 
childhood education, develop and support great teachers, empower principles to be great 
school leaders, encourage innovation, require accountability, and establish a simple and 
fair funding system (Vision, 2006). 
In 2009, Delaware ranked 18th in the EPE Quality Counts rankings. They received 
a C+, with an overall score of 77.4%. The state did not score an A in any of the six key 
indicators for success. However, Delaware scored above average in three categories, 
school finance; standards, assessments and accountability; and chance for success. 
Conversely, K-12 achievement received a 72.2% largely based on their low percentage of 
proficiency in math and reading and their 62% graduation rate. Delaware also failed to 
create policies that defined and assessed elementary school readiness and lacked 
interventions to help students who were not prepared for school which gave them a score 
of 64.3% for transition and alignment. Based on the low scores given in the EPE Quality 
Counts report, Delaware met the criteria of an education system in need of improvement. 
In 2008, Delaware overwhelmingly supported Barack Obama for president, 
awarding him nearly 62% of the statewide vote. This is not surprising because Joseph 
Biden, a 36-year Senator from the state, was the vice-presidential candidate on the ticket. 
As a core state, Delaware would not be a strategic investment for the 2012 election. 
Based on my analysis, Delaware was a core constituency for President Obama, 
and it would not benefit his 2012 reelection efforts to award the state RTTT funds. 
However, Delaware was in the bottom 2/3 in the Quality Counts 2009 rankings and was 
prepared to utilize a RTTT grant to benefit the state’s education system. I conclude that 
Howell’s presidential entrepreneurialism theory applies to the state of Delaware. 
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Tennessee 
Tennessee had been making efforts to improve the state’s education system 
through its Value Added Assessment program for more than a decade. However, based 
on the requirements of RTTT, the state had to convene a special session of the legislature. 
During the speedy 2-week session, legislators signed Tennessee’s First to the Top Act of 
2010 and the Complete College Tennessee Act of 2010. Through these new policies, 
Tennessee Governor Phillip Bredesen, hoped to create an opportunity for the state to be 
awarded a RTTT grant (Sher, 2009). 
Like Delaware, Tennessee settled near the middle of the pack in the EPE 
education rankings, just slightly behind Delaware at 21st. They received a score of 77%, 
with an overall grade of a C+. Their A- in the Standards, Assessments and Accountability 
category, was overshadowed by a D+ in both K-12 achievement and school finance. The 
state had assessment tests that were aligned with state standards at every grade level and 
the assigned ratings to schools based on their annual year progress (AYP) placing them in 
the top 5% in that category. Conversely, the state had a less than 30% efficiency in both 
math and reading in 4th and 8th grade and spent $7620 per student, ranking them 47th in 
per pupil expenditure. According to my methodology, Tennessee, based on their overall 
score of 77%, was in need of improvement in education. 
John McCain came out on top among the voters in Tennessee receiving 56.9% of 
the vote. For President Obama, this made Tennessee a lost cause state. It was unlikely 
that awarding the state a RTTT grant would shift the voting behavior in his favor in 2012. 
As a lost cause state, Tennessee would not be a strategic electoral investment for 
President Obama. 
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Based on my analysis, Tennessee was a lost cause state for President Obama, 
therefore, it would not benefit him to invest RTTT funds for his reelection efforts. 
However, Tennessee did have areas of improvement in education that made awarding a 
RTTT grant a benefit to the policy objectives of the Obama Administration. For those 
reasons, I conclude that the presidential entrepreneurialism theory applies to the state of 
Tennessee. 
Phase Two 
District of Columbia (D.C.) 
In 2005, the Washington Lawyers’ Committee issued a report on D.C. Public 
Schools (DCPS) and found that when compared to surrounding school districts in 
Maryland and Virginia, they underperformed in almost every area. To help facilitate 
educational improvement, a fundamental change was made to the governance of the 
District’s public schools. The Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007 
separated the DCPS from the D.C. Board of Education and put it under the direct control 
of the mayor’s office (Withycombe, 2010). Mayor Adrian Fenty then appointed Michelle 
Rhee as the DCPS Chancellor, who set out to close failing schools and introduce new 
teacher performance evaluations. By the end of 2008, Rhee had closed 23 under enrolled 
schools and dismissed 250 teachers who had not met certification deadlines (Maxwell, 
2008). 
According to the EPE Quality Counts Report, D.C. had not yet made significant 
improvements in 2009 and ranked last among all states, receiving a 68.3%. This included 
a failing grade in K-12 achievement, a D- in the teaching profession, and D+ in 
transitions and alignment. D.C. was not graded for school finance since it is a single-
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district jurisdiction making it impossible to measure financial equity among districts. The 
K-12 achievement numbers were startling. The National Assessment of Education 
Progress (NAEP) reports math and reading proficiency for the EPE studies and reported 
that only 8% of 8th grade student were proficient in math and only 12% in reading in the 
D.C. schools. The need for reform and improvement was evident. Based on my 
methodology, D.C. was in the most need of education reform. 
The District of Columbia overwhelmingly supported the Obama ticket in 2008. I 
would classify D.C. as a core state given the margin of victory, 92.46% for Obama to a 
mere 6.53% for his opponents. D.C. has participated in 14 presidential elections and has 
voted Democrat in every one (Presidential Elections, n.d.). Based on my criteria, Obama 
would not receive any greater electoral benefit by awarding an RTTT grant to D.C. 
Based on my analysis, D.C. was a core state for President Obama. According to 
Hudak’s theory, a president will not benefit in an upcoming election by awarding a 
federal grant to a core state (Hudak, 2014). Therefore, presidential particularism does not 
apply to the District of Columbia. However, D.C. was the state in most need of 
improvement, based on my criteria. Awarding D.C. the $75 million Phase 2 award would 
align with Howell’s presidential entrepreneurialism theory. 
Hawaii 
Applying for the Race to the Top grant was part of an intensive effort to transform 
Hawaii's school system from one of the nation's worst, by some metrics, to one of its 
most improved. The governor and the state legislature worked together to pass legislation 
to improve their chances in RTTT. This included initiatives changing the kindergarten 
entrance age to align with other states, improve data sharing among the Department of 
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Education and University of Hawaii to improve the state’s longitudinal data system, and 
they formed a task force to recommend ways to strengthen Hawaii’s early education 
system (Brown, 2010). 
However, Hawaii is a geographically-challenging state, the eight-island chain 
2,400 miles off the coast of California features a single state-run school district of 
185,000 students with 255 schools. One million of its 1.3 million residents live on the 
island of Oahu, which includes Honolulu, meaning much of Hawaii is extremely rural 
and its schools are very remote (McNeil, 2013). 
In the EPE Quality Counts Report 2009, Hawaii ranked 33rd with a 75.1%. Hawaii 
had some similarities to D.C. as it is a single-district jurisdiction, therefore it did not have 
a ranking for school finance and it struggled with K-12 achievement. Although the state 
did not receive a failing grade in the state achievement index, their 65.1% was a 
reflection of low percentages in both Math and English proficiency. Based on my criteria 
for need, the 75.1% score by Hawaii fits my model. 
Like D.C., Hawaii overwhelmingly supported Barack Obama in the 2008 election. 
The Obama ticket received 71.85% of the vote, making it a core state for President 
Obama. Hawaii is predominantly a one-party state. Democrats have dominated the 
politics of Hawaii for decades and the electoral votes have gone to a Republican 
candidate only twice in history (Sutter, 2012). Based on my criteria, Hawaii would be 
considered a core state and therefore President Obama would not benefit electorally in 
2012 from awarding Hawaii an RTTT grant. 
Based on my analysis, Hawaii was a core state for President Obama. The 
president would not benefit in an upcoming election by awarding a federal grant to a core 
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state, according to the particularist theory. Therefore, presidential particularism does not 
apply to Hawaii. However, based on the criteria I established for presidential 
entrepreneurialism, Hawaii was a state in need of improvement in education. Therefore, 
the entrepreneurialism theory applies to the RTTT grant awarded by the Obama 
administration in Hawaii. 
Rhode Island 
Rhode Island was a little state with big problems in education when the state was 
preparing their application for RTTT. In 2009, the state appointed Deborah Gist as 
Education Commissioner. Shortly after taking office, she announced that staffing 
decisions would be based on teacher qualifications, not seniority (Ripley, 2010). She also 
supported a decision by Central Falls School District superintendent Frances Gallo to fire 
all teachers, administrators, and support personnel at one of the worst schools in the state 
after they rejected a series of proposed reforms made by the commissioner (Kaye, 2010).  
For most states, lack of education funding is a big problem. However, Rhode 
Island was one of only two states to receive an A in the school finance category in the 
EPE report. The per pupil expenditure was in the top six states (Vermont, $15,139; 
Wyoming, $14,126; New Jersey, $13,238; New York, $13,064; Maine, $12,985; Rhode 
Island, $12,478) and 100% of the districts had a per pupil expenditure above the national 
average. Despite the willingness to spend money on education, Rhode Island‘s K-12 
achievement and the teaching profession both received a D in the EPE Quality Counts 
Report 2009. The low graduation rate and low math and reading proficiency contributed 
to the low score in K-12 achievement. There was also a large list of deficiencies in the 
teaching profession. Even though teacher salaries were 111.8% of the salaries in 
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comparable occupations, teachers were not required to have any formal coursework in the 
area they teach and they were not required to take a written test to assess their basic 
teaching skills. At the time of the report, Rhode Island also did not have any type of 
evaluation system for teacher performance. The combination of these factors gave Rhode 
Island an overall score of 76% on the EPE report indicating that the state was in need of 
policies to improve education. 
Rhode Island is among the most Democratic-leaning states. It ranks as the fourth 
bluest state in the nation in the FiveThirtyEight Presidential Voting Index (Cohen, 2012). 
The 2008 presidential election was no exception, where Barack Obama received 62.86% 
of the vote. According to my methodology, if Obama received more than 55% of the 
vote, I classify it as a core state, therefore, awarding Rhode Island an RTTT grant would 
not have benefitted the 2012 election. 
Based on my analysis, Rhode Island had a need for education policy reform to 
improve its struggling system. Therefore, presidential entrepreneurialism applies in this 
case. Further, presidential particularism does not apply to Rhode Island because, 
according to my criteria, it was a core state and therefore, would not provide electoral 
benefit to President Obama in the 2012 election. 
Maryland 
To prepare for the RTTT grant application process, Governor Martin O’Malley 
signed an executive order in June of 2010 to expedite teacher performance evaluation 
policies while Maryland policy makers drafted The Education Reform Act of 2010. The 
act significantly changed Maryland’s teacher and principal evaluation process and 
required the State Board of Education to adopt regulations establishing general standards 
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for performance evaluations of certificated teachers and principals which required student 
achievement to be a significant component of those evaluations (Anderson, 2010). 
In the EPE Quality Counts report in my study, Maryland ranked highest among all 
states with an 84.7%. The only area that carried any low marks was in the teaching 
profession category, based on their lack of teacher accountability measures. Their C- 
score was attributed to the lack of policies that evaluate teachers based on student 
achievement on an annual basis (the study was completed prior to the 2010 policy 
changes) and that the state does not have a cap on the number of out-of-field teachers. In 
all other areas, Maryland scored at least a B. Based on my criteria, Maryland was not a 
state in need of reform policies that would benefit the Obama Administration’s education 
policy objectives. 
Maryland has historically been a state that supports Democrats. In a 2008 Gallup 
Poll, Maryland ranked in the top ten of the most Democratic leaning states, at number 8 
(Jones, 2009). The 2008 Presidential election supported that outcome. Barack Obama 
defeated John McCain by over 25 percentage points, validating the survey data from 
Gallup that indicated that Democrats had a 26-point advantage going into the 2008 
election (Jones, 2009). That resounding defeat made Maryland a core state according to 
my methodology, therefore Maryland would not have been a strategic state to award a 
RTTT grant in order to receive any electoral benefit in the 2012 election. 
Based on my analysis, Maryland does not meet the criteria for either presidential 
particularism or entrepreneurialism. The state ranked number one in the nation according 
to the EPE report, and it was a core state based on the its voting behavior in the 2008 
34 
 
 
election. Therefore I cannot make a conclusive determination about whether the RTTT 
award was based on the entrepreneurialism theory or the particularism theory. 
Massachusetts 
In 1993, Massachusetts developed the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment 
System (MCAS) to raise the academic standards for the state by providing a testing 
framework in math, English and the sciences. The program identified weaknesses in both 
student learning and teaching methods and held teachers accountable for student 
outcomes (Kruger, 2009). Since that time, Massachusetts students have repeatedly ranked 
among the best in the nation. The Governor’s Achievement Gap Act of 2010, was signed 
in late January 2010 and provided new and more immediate opportunities to turn around 
underperforming schools and close achievement gaps, expand access to successful 
charter schools, and authorize new ‘Innovation Schools’ to provide greater choice for 
students and their families (Governor Patrick, Congressional Delegation 2010). 
In the 2009 EPE Quality Counts Report, only 0.1% separated number one 
Maryland and number two Massachusetts. The 84.6% for Massachusetts demonstrated 
that the state was solid in most categories, however, the report indicated that the changes 
proposed in 2010, were necessary to increase the C’s they received in both transitions and 
alignment and the teaching profession. Overall, the state, according to my model, was not 
in need of education policies that would significantly change their national ranking. 
Like Maryland, Massachusetts overwhelmingly supported Barack Obama in 2008. 
Since Obama received over 55% of the vote in the state, it is not likely the Obama 
Administration would choose Massachusetts to strategically target RTTT dollars in order 
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to gain electoral support for the 2012 election, therefore disqualifying presidential 
particularism as a motive for granting the RTTT award. 
Based on my analysis, Massachusetts does not satisfy the criteria for either 
presidential particularism or entrepreneurialism. Based on the number two ranking by the 
Quality Counts report and the core classification based on the 2008 election results, I am 
unable to make a conclusive argument for entrepreneurialism or particularism. 
Georgia 
In 2008, Georgia Republicans controlled the majority in both the State House of 
Representatives and the Senate with Republican Governor Sonny Perdue at the helm. 
When President Obama introduced the RTTT competition, state lawmakers were not 
interested in entering the competition because they believed that the Obama 
Administration was attempting to exert federal authority over state education by bribing 
states to make changes to meet the RTTT application requirements (Badertscher and 
McWhirter, 2010). However, Governor Perdue believed that education reforms were 
needed despite the appearance of federal control and believed that the U.S. Department of 
Education did not want to have control over state education. According to Perdue, “The 
feds gave us no rules. They said, you put together a plan that you can 
implement"(Badertscher and McWhirter, 2010). 
Georgia was not one of the worst states in need of sweeping education reform. In 
fact, they ranked number eight in EPE Quality Counts Report, with an overall score of 
80%. The above average overall grade was due, in part, to the established standards, 
accountability and assessments for students and educators. The state had already adopted 
standards for all core subjects, including language arts, math, science and social studies 
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and used standardized assessments aligned to those standards. Despite those efforts, 
Georgia had the second lowest graduation rate in the nation at 56.1%. Although Georgia 
had areas of education in need of improvement, their overall grade of a B excluded them 
from meeting the criteria of need outlined in my methodology. 
Like many southern states, Georgia voted Republican in the 2008 election. John 
McCain won the election with 52.2% of the vote, leaving some room for President 
Obama to persuade the voters to support him in 2012. In my model, any state won or lost 
by less than 10% would be considered a swing state and therefore, voters could be 
persuaded to vote for Obama in 2012. Therefore, awarding an RTTT grant to Georgia 
could benefit President Obama in the next presidential election. 
Based on my analysis, presidential entrepreneurialism could not factor into 
Georgia winning the RTTT grant because it was not a state in “need” based on my model. 
However, as a swing state, it is possible that by the Obama Administration awarding the 
grant to Georgia, they could win the state in 2012, therefore, supporting the presidential 
particularism theory in this study. 
North Carolina 
North Carolina has a very large and diverse school system that often struggles to 
meet the needs of its students. The local education agencies (LEAs), which have 
approximately 2,500 traditional and charter schools, 191,000 staff, and a diverse 
population of over 1.4 million students (54.2% white, 31.2% black, 10.7% Hispanic, 
2.5% Asian, and 1.4% American Indian), about half of whom are classified as 
disadvantaged (Henkel, 2010). For the state, entering the RTTT competition was an 
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opportunity to provide the additional resources needed to benefit more of its student 
population (Brown, 2010). 
North Carolina proved to be a school in need based on the EPE report. The state 
received an overall score of 75.5%, with a D+ in three categories (transitions and 
alignment, school finance, and K-12 achievement transitions and alignment, school 
finance, and K-12 achievement). The lack of readiness standards and assessments, as well 
as a failure of the state to align their curriculum with post-secondary preparation 
attributed to the 67.9% in transitions and alignment. School finance came down to the 
extremely low per pupil expenditure of $7835, the 2nd lowest among the winners and in 
the bottom 20% of all states. The 66.7% in K-12 achievement was a combination of low 
math and reading proficiency and a graduation rate below the national average at 66.1%.   
Barack Obama won the state of North Carolina by the closest margin (0.32%) of 
any state, by either candidate. In recent years, many pundits have classified North 
Carolina as a swing state because it has not held constant to any party in any area of 
national and state government for decades (Cillizza, 2013). According to my model, I 
would categorize North Carolina as a swing state, making it possible that President 
Obama awarded the RTTT to the state, hoping for electoral benefit in 2012 election. 
Both presidential entrepreneurialism and presidential particularism could apply to 
North Carolina. The state was both in need of education reform policies to improve their 
struggling system, and North Carolina was a hotly contested presidential race in the 2008 
election. In my analysis, I am unable to draw a definitive conclusion based on my 
decision rules for entrepreneurialism and particularism as they both apply. 
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Ohio 
In 2010, Ohio had 1.8 million students who were educated in 3,545 school 
buildings.  Those children spoke 112 different home languages, and 40% of them were 
considered economically disadvantaged (Provance, 2010). Governor Ted Strickland 
believed that winning the RTTT would help lift the entire state, though large cities like 
Cleveland with the most disadvantaged students would likely receive the most money 
(Starzyk, 2010). To win a portion of the $4.35 billion offered by the Obama 
Administration, states had to have letters of commitment from local education agencies 
(LEA). As an incentive to gain support of teachers in Ohio school districts, the State 
Department of Education offered $100,000 to each district that signed a letter of 
commitment. Eventually, 500 districts and charter schools pledged their support to the 
education reform plan. This meant that nearly every public-school student in the region 
would benefit directly if Ohio received a grant (Provance, 2010). 
Going into Phase two of RTTT, Ohio ranked 6th in the EPE Quality Counts 
Report with an 81.2%. The B- score for the state meant that its schools were not among 
the most in need of policies that would improve education. Their B- scores in the chance 
for success, transitions and alignments, and school finance were all attributed the 
percentage of taxable resources spent on education. At 4.3%, it was the highest among 
the RTTT winners. The state did struggle in the area of K-12 achievement, most notably 
because of their low reading and math proficiencies with the highest percentage coming 
in 4th grade math at 45.9%.  All other indicators were in the mid 30’s. Given the relative 
success in most education areas with an overall score above 80%, Ohio did not meet the 
criteria in my model for need. 
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Ohio has historically been the state where presidents are made. Eric Ostermeier, a 
research associate at the University of Minnesota’s Humphrey School of Public Affairs’ 
Center for the Study of Politics and Governance explained that in 29 presidential 
elections since 1900, there is no state in the nation that comes closer to the national vote 
in presidential elections than Ohio (Wilkerson, 2015). The 2008, Obama edged out John 
McCain earning the support of 51.5% of the voters in Ohio. In political circles, 
Pennsylvania, Florida and Ohio are the three quintessential swing states in the nation 
(Lee, 2012). According to my model, I also classify Ohio as a swing state. As a swing 
state, President Obama could receive electoral benefit from awarding the state $400 
million. 
Based on my analysis, presidential entrepreneurialism was not a factor in 
awarding Ohio the RTTT grant because it was not a state in need based on my model. 
However, as a swing state, it is possible that the Obama Administration awarded the grant 
to Ohio with the hope of receiving electoral benefit in 2012. 
Florida 
In 2002, voters approved a constitutional amendment to limit class size in public 
schools, allowing only 18 students in lower grades and 23 students in high school 
classrooms. Florida had also been implementing data and test driven reforms decades 
prior to RTTT.  To help in their efforts to win RTTT dollars, the Florida Statehouse 
passed legislation to improve teacher quality by raising entry-level certification standards 
and developing pay systems that rewarded teachers based primarily on student 
performance rather than tenure (Solocheck and Matus, 2010). 
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Florida ranked just outside of the top ten at number 11 in the 2009 EPE Quality 
Counts Report. Their 79.6% fell within my condition rule for a state in need of 
educational policy reform. Florida’s lowest grade came in school finance at a 71.2%. with 
the lowest percentage of students with a per pupil expenditure at or above the national 
average at 6.6% and their total taxable resources spent on education was near the bottom 
at 3.1%. Their strength came in standards, assessments, and accountability. Florida had 
well established accountability measures for teachers and measured student performance 
at all grade levels. The areas of strength pushed Florida just above average, but they were 
still in need of additional policy reforms, therefore falling within my criteria for need. 
Florida has 29 electoral votes and has voted three times for a Democrat and twice 
for a Republican in the last 20 years. The most controversial was the race decided by the 
courts in 2000, in favor of George W. Bush. Bill Clinton lost there in 1992 but won in 
1996 (McManus, 2016). In 2008, Florida met the criteria, adopted from Hudak, for a 
swing state with a margin of victory of less than 10%. Based on my condition rule, 
granting Florida a RTTT grant could benefit President Obama in the 2012 election. 
The Obama Administration’s decision to grant Florida $700 million could have 
been justified by either presidential entrepreneurialism and presidential particularism. 
The state was in need of education reform policies to improve certain areas, especially in 
school finance, and Obama narrowly won the 2008 presidential race. In my analysis, I am 
unable to draw a definitive conclusion based on my decision rules for entrepreneurialism 
and particularism as both theories could apply. 
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New York 
Teacher accountability had been a contentious issue in New York for decades. In 
1917, a bill was passed granting tenure to teachers after three years on the job. Short of 
being charged with a crime, teachers in New York were guaranteed a job if they had been 
employed for 3 years. Finally, in 2002, there was legislation to repeal the long-standing 
tenure policy but, the United Federation of Teachers lobbied to block that effort, keeping 
even the worst teachers in the classroom because of a law over 100 years old (Brill, 
2009). 
Despite the battle over teacher tenure, New York ranked 3rd overall in the EPE 
report with an 84.1%. The state excelled in standards, assessments, and accountability, 
scoring the highest of any winning state with a score of 94%. The lowest score came in 
the teaching profession. New York did not have a pay for performance program that 
awarded teachers for student achievement and the state did not place a cap on the number 
of out-of-field teachers in a subject area. However, by 2007, teachers were formally 
evaluated based on their performance, but still could not be fired based on that 
performance if they had tenure. According to my criteria for need, New York did not fit 
in my model with a score of over 80%. 
Ronald Reagan was the last Republican to win a presidential election in New 
York, and Republicans have only won 3 times since 1960 (Galka, 2015). Given the 
margin of victory in the 2008 election (26.85%), New York is categorized as a core state 
in my model. Therefore, awarding New York an RTTT grant would not affect the 2012 
election outcome. 
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Based on my analysis, New York does not meet the criteria for either presidential 
particularism or entrepreneurialism. The state ranked number three in the nation 
according to the EPE report and was a core state for Barack Obama, therefore I cannot 
make a conclusive determination about whether awarding New York the RTTT grant was 
based on the entrepreneurialism theory or the particularism theory because the state does 
not fit my model for either theory. 
Table 3:  Results 
State Entrepreneurialism Particularism Both Neither 
Delaware       
Tennessee       
District of 
Columbia 
      
Hawaii       
Rhode Island       
Maryland     
Massachusetts     
Georgia      
North Carolina       
Ohio      
Florida       
New York     
Results for each state, indicating which, if either theory applied to the state based on 
the criteria in my methodology 
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CONCLUSION 
The ARRA provided the Obama Administration with the opportunity to creatively 
use the distribution of federal grant money to administer their education policy agenda 
without legislative action. The success or failure of those policies was not the focus of 
this study, but rather why President Obama would use this type of unilateral action. I 
introduced two contending theories about why presidents engage in this type of politics. 
Presidential particularism introduced by John Hudak as well as Douglas Kriner 
and Andrew Reeves, and presidential entrepreneurialism by William Howell explain why 
presidents seek unilateral action and make legislative decisions outside of Congress. 
Looking at each of them in terms of Race to the Top allowed me to evaluate the winners 
in each state to learn which of these theories apply to this unique unilateral action, based 
on the criteria I put forth in my methodology. In my research, I was able to determine, 
based on my criteria, that five of the twelve states could have been selected based on 
presidential entrepreneurialism. Delaware, Tennessee, D.C., Hawaii, and Rhode Island 
were all in need of policy reform to improve education in their state and President Obama 
was not likely to benefit electorally from awarding the grant to the states. Georgia and 
Ohio both had education systems that scored above an 80% in the EPE Quality Counts 
Report 2009, therefore not needing education policy reform based on my criteria. 
However, both states had hotly contested presidential races in 2008, Obama taking Ohio 
by less than 5% of the vote and McCain winning in Georgia by just over 5%. According 
to my decision rules, both of these states were considered swing states. I, therefore, 
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determined that it was possible that the Obama Administration chose these two states 
based on the particularist theory. In the other five states, Maryland, Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, Florida and New York, I was unable to make a definitive decision about the 
motivation of President Obama in this unilateral action. Maryland, Massachusetts, and 
New York ranked one, two and three in the 2009 report, and therefore, were not classified 
as states in need of education policy reform. Each of those three states were also 
Democratic strongholds. Obama carried all three by more than 25 percentage points. 
Given my decision rules, neither theory applies. North Carolina and Florida, on the other 
hand, met the criteria for both entrepreneurialism and particularism. Florida’s overall 
EPE score was just below 80% at 79.6%, therefore, based on my criteria, needed 
education policy reform. North Carolina scored a 75.5%, also making it a state in need. In 
addition to both states being in need of policy reform, they were also classified as swing 
states.  Obama won in North Carolina by a mere 0.32% and in Florida by just over 2%. 
Presidential entrepreneurialism and presidential particularism are both valid 
theories about why a president would use their unilateral authority. The RTTT was a 
unique process in many ways. It was created by a budgetary act approved by Congress 
with an executive earmark for education funding based on a competition open to all 
states. It also required that states create policies that aligned with the Obama education 
agenda. The Obama Administration did not mandate specific policies, points, and 
therefore the overall scores, were based on the ability of the state-created policies to align 
with the scoring guidelines. 
Not all states participated in the competition, some citing that the program 
allowed too much federal government policy into state-run education. Texas Governor 
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Rick Perry asserted that it was too much government intrusion and would place the future 
of children in the hands of special interest groups and unelected bureaucrats (Dillon, 
2010). Alaska also did not apply for either phase of the program. Alaskan Education 
Commissioner Larry LeDoux said that it would mean Alaska would have to give up some 
sovereignty to an inflexible program calling for too much change, too fast (Hsieh, 2010). 
There were 34 states that participated in one or both phases that did not win, but 
that still created policies that were in-line the Obama agenda. I have added the points 
breakdown for all states that participated in phase one and phase two in Appendix A and 
B, showing what improvements were made based on the scoring in each state, and what 
policy areas still lacked based on those scores. It is evident in the scoring that some 
policy innovation was made that aligned with the Obama Administration’s education 
agenda. 
Based solely on the outcomes of the winners in my model, I could lean toward the 
theory of presidential entrepreneurialism as the theory behind the RTTT competition but 
it would not be definitive. However, since Texas and Alaska did not want to participate 
because of the policy implications and the 46 states that participated adopted Obama 
Administration inspired education policies, I believe that the Obama Administration was 
most interested in advancing their policies with RTTT. Given the polarization at the 
federal level, I think that we will see more innovative unilateral actions taken to advance 
policies than in decades past. While I think there is always the potential for presidents to 
use their unilateral powers for political gain, it is no longer the only reason. 
Finally, future research could look at other impacts on the way that presidents use 
their unilateral authority. I only looked at one unilateral action by one president to 
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measure whether presidents are more likely to use their executive authority for policy 
advancement or electoral benefit. More research could be done over a series of presidents 
with multiple unilateral actions, which could give a clearer picture. Additional research 
could also be done on the timing of certain unilateral actions. For example, President 
Trump signed executive orders in the first few weeks that were based on campaign 
promises. Could the timing of those unilateral actions create a new theory to explain the 
causal mechanisms?  This line of inquiry may be necessary during the Trump 
Administration, because his actions already seem to defy the logic of past presidential 
actions. I believe that, based on the research I conducted, there is a great deal to be 
learned about how modern presidents use their unilateral authority. Future research may 
be able to shed more light on how much impact, the office of the president, will have on 
citizens of the United States as well as people around the world. 
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Table A1 Phase 1 Finalist Scoring 
  POSSIBLE DE TN GA FL IL SC PA RI KY OH LA NC MA CO NY 
A. State Success Factors 125 119 112 103 100 93 100 107 99 114 101 102 109 111 95 104 
(A)(1) Articulating State's 
education reform agenda and 
LEA's participation in it 
65 65 63 53 49 53 56 60 51 64 55 54 63 55 52 54 
(i) Articulating comprehensive, 
coherent reform agenda 
5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 
(ii) Securing LEA commitment 45 45 44 39 36 39 40 44 35 45 39 40 44 36 37 37 
(iii) Translating LEA 
participation into statewide 
impact 
15 15 14 9 9 10 12 11 11 14 11 10 14 14 11 12 
(A)(2) Building strong statewide 
capacity to implement, scale up, 
and sustain proposed plans 
30 28 28 23 24 24 22 27 25 28 29 25 25 28 27 25 
(i) Ensuring the capacity to 
implement 
20 18 18 17 17 15 16 18 17 19 19 16 16 18 18 17 
(ii) Using broad stakeholder 
support 
10 10 10 6 7 9 7 9 8 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 
(A)(3) Demonstrating significant 
progress in raising achievement 
and closing gaps 
30 27 21 26 27 16 22 20 24 21 18 22 21 29 17 25 
(i) Making progress in each 
reform area 
5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 
(ii) Improving student outcomes 25 22 16 22 22 13 17 16 19 17 13 18 16 24 12 20 
B. Standards and Assessments 70 69 68 66 69 69 68 65 66 68 69 65 67 54 63 65 
(B)(1) Developing and adopting 
common standards 
40 40 40 38 40 40 40 38 38 40 40 38 40 25 40 39 
(i) Participating in consortium 
developing high-quality 
standards 
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 19 20 20 19 20 20 20 20 
(ii) Adopting standards 20 20 20 18 20 20 20 20 19 20 20 19 20 5 20 19 
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(B)(2) Developing and 
implementing common, high-
quality assessments 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 7 9 
(B)(3) Supporting the transition 
to enhanced standards and high-
quality assessments 
20 19 19 17 19 19 19 18 18 19 20 18 17 19 16 17 
C. Data Systems to Support 
Instruction 
47 47 44 41 41 39 41 36 32 43 39 36 32 38 38 30 
(C)(1) Fully implementing a 
statewide longitudinal data 
system 
24 24 24 21 24 20 20 16 12 22 18 18 16 18 18 10 
(C)(2) Accessing and using State 
data 
5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 5 5 5 
(C)(3) Using data to improve 
instruction 
18 18 15 16 13 14 16 15 15 16 16 14 13 16 15 16 
D. Great Teachers and Leaders 138 119 114 111 109 110 114 106 121 111 103 122 112 101 105 111 
(D)(1) Providing high-quality 
pathways for aspiring teachers 
and principals 
21 17 15 15 16 19 16 12 18 20 16 19 17 19 14 20 
(D)(2) Improving teacher and 
principal effectiveness based on 
performance 
58 50 53 50 47 47 53 49 54 44 50 52 48 40 48 41 
(i) Measuring student growth 5 4 5 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 
(ii) Developing evaluation 
systems 
15 13 14 12 11 13 13 13 14 12 13 14 12 12 12 12 
(iii) Conducting annual 
evaluations 
10 9 10 10 8 7 9 10 10 6 9 9 8 6 9 9 
(iv) Using evaluations to inform 
key decisions 
28 24 24 25 24 23 26 23 26 21 23 25 24 17 22 17 
(D)(3) Ensuring equitable 
distribution of effective teachers 
and principals 
25 21 18 22 18 18 18 19 20 18 13 22 20 17 17 21 
(i) Ensuring equitable 
distribution in high-poverty or 
high-minority schools 
15 12 10 14 11 11 10 13 14 11 10 13 13 10 11 13 
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(ii) Ensuring equitable 
distribution in hard-to-staff 
subjects and specialty areas 
10 9 8 8 7 7 8 6 6 7 4 9 7 7 7 8 
(D)(4) Improving the 
effectiveness of teacher and 
principal preparation programs 
14 11 13 10 11 10 11 9 13 11 9 12 10 9 12 12 
(D)(5) Providing effective 
support to teachers and principals 
20 19 15 15 16 16 16 16 17 18 14 17 17 17 14 17 
E. Turning Around the 
Lowest-Achieving Schools 
50 43 48 47 44 49 44 45 45 45 43 45 45 47 45 43 
(E)(1) Intervening in the lowest-
achieving schools and LEAs 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 
(E)(2) Turning around the 
lowest-achieving schools 
40 33 38 37 34 39 34 35 35 35 33 40 35 37 36 33 
(i) Identifying the persistently 
lowest-achieving schools 
5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 
(ii) Turning around the 
persistently lowest-achieving 
schools 
35 28 33 32 29 34 29 31 30 31 29 35 30 32 31 29 
F. General 55 42 43 50 54 49 41 45 41 22 49 48 35 44 49 39 
(F)(1) Making education funding 
a priority 
10 8 9 9 10 9 8 9 4 10 10 10 8 10 5 8 
(F)(2) Ensuring successful 
conditions for high-performing 
charter schools and other 
innovative schools 
40 31 30 37 39 35 29 31 31 8 34 34 23 29 40 27 
(F)(3) Demonstrating other 
significant reform conditions 
5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 
Competitive Preference Priority 
2: Emphasis on STEM 
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 0 15 15 15 15 
Total 500 455 444 434 431 424 423 420 419 419 419 418 414 411 410 409 
    Source: U.S. Department of Education 
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Table A2 Phase 2 Finalist Scoring 
  POSS MA NY HI FL RI DC MD GA NC OH NJ AZ LA SC IL CA CO PA KY 
A. State Success 
Factors 
125 115 108 116 112 102 113 111 104 112 111 104 105 106 103 103 100 98 103 108 
(A)(1) 
Articulating 
State's education 
reform agenda 
and LEA's 
participation in it 
65 57 55 62 60 50 59 55 55 64 59 51 58 57 64 53 51 52 56 57 
(i) Articulating 
comprehensive, 
coherent reform 
agenda 
5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 
(ii) Securing LEA 
commitment 
45 39 39 43 42 34 41 38 37 45 41 34 40 40 45 35 35 37 41 40 
(iii) Translating 
LEA participation 
into statewide 
impact 
15 13 11 14 13 12 13 12 12 15 13 12 13 12 15 13 12 11 10 12 
(A)(2) Building 
strong statewide 
capacity to 
implement, scale 
up, and sustain 
proposed plans 
30 29 29 30 25 27 27 28 25 27 28 27 26 25 26 26 25 24 26 28 
(i) Ensuring the 
capacity to 
implement 
20 20 19 20 18 19 18 20 18 18 18 20 18 17 17 17 18 17 18 18 
(ii) Using broad 
stakeholder 
support 
10 9 10 10 7 8 8 8 7 9 10 7 8 8 9 9 7 7 8 10 
(A)(3) 
Demonstrating 
significant 
30 29 25 24 28 24 27 28 25 21 25 26 22 24 13 24 24 21 22 22 
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progress in 
raising 
achievement and 
closing gaps 
(i) Making 
progress in each 
reform area 
5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 
(ii) Improving 
student outcomes 
25 24 20 19 23 19 22 23 20 16 20 21 17 19 9 19 19 17 17 18 
B. Standards 
and Assessments 
70 70 70 69 68 70 68 70 70 68 68 69 67 66 67 65 69 66 69 67 
(B)(1) 
Developing and 
adopting common 
standards 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
(i) Participating 
in consortium 
developing high-
quality standards 
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
(ii) Adopting 
standards 
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
(B)(2) 
Developing and 
implementing 
common, high-
quality 
assessments 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
(i) Participating 
in consortium 
developing high-
quality 
assessments 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
(ii) Including a 
significant 
number of States 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
(B)(3) Supporting 
the transition to 
20 20 20 20 18 20 18 20 20 18 18 19 17 16 17 15 19 16 19 17 
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enhanced 
standards and 
high-quality 
assessments 
C. Data Systems 
to Support 
Instruction 
47 44 46 44 41 47 35 41 43 40 37 31 36 43 43 42 31 42 45 43 
(C)(1) Fully 
implementing a 
statewide 
longitudinal data 
system 
24 24 24 22 24 24 14 20 24 22 18 14 18 24 22 20 10 22 24 22 
(C)(2) Accessing 
and using State 
data 
5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 
(C)(3) Using data 
to improve 
instruction 
18 15 17 17 13 18 17 16 14 14 14 13 14 15 16 17 16 15 16 16 
(i) Ensuring 
implementation 
of instructional 
improvement 
systems 
6 5 6 6 5 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 
(ii) Providing 
effective 
professional 
development 
6 6 6 5 4 6 6 6 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 
(iii) Making data 
accessible 
6 5 6 6 5 6 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 
D. Great 
Teachers and 
Leaders 
138 127 128 122 116 120 118 126 120 116 120 124 114 111 111 111 110 105 95 113 
(D)(1) Providing 
high-quality 
pathways for 
aspiring teachers 
and principals 
21 21 19 14 18 17 20 20 17 18 15 17 15 17 14 18 13 17 10 18 
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(i) Legal, 
statutory, and 
regulatory 
provisions 
7 7 7 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 6 4 7 6 6 2 6 
(ii) Alternative 
routes to 
certification 
7 7 7 4 6 5 7 7 5 6 5 6 4 6 5 6 3 6 3 6 
(iii) Identifying 
and filling 
shortages 
7 7 6 5 6 6 7 6 4 6 4 4 4 5 5 6 4 5 5 6 
(D)(2) Improving 
teacher and 
principal 
effectiveness 
based on 
performance 
58 53 54 55 48 50 54 53 55 51 54 54 52 48 52 47 49 43 45 48 
(i) Measuring 
student growth 
5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 3 4 4 3 5 
(ii) Developing 
evaluation 
systems 
15 15 13 14 12 11 13 15 14 14 15 15 14 12 14 12 14 10 14 10 
(iii) Conducting 
annual 
evaluations 
10 9 9 10 7 10 9 8 9 10 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 8 8 9 
(iv) Using 
evaluations to 
inform key 
decisions 
28 24 28 26 25 26 27 25 26 23 27 25 25 23 25 25 22 20 20 24 
(D)(3) Ensuring 
equitable 
distribution of 
effective teachers 
and principals 
25 23 22 24 20 23 19 22 19 19 20 22 20 20 24 19 20 17 17 16 
(i) Ensuring 
equitable 
distribution in 
high-poverty or 
15 14 13 14 12 13 12 14 12 12 12 13 12 12 14 12 13 9 10 9 
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high-minority 
schools 
(ii) Ensuring 
equitable 
distribution in 
hard-to-staff 
subjects and 
specialty areas 
10 9 9 9 8 10 7 9 7 8 8 9 8 8 10 7 8 8 7 6 
(D)(4) Improving 
the effectiveness 
of teacher and 
principal 
preparation 
programs 
14 13 14 12 12 12 10 12 11 11 12 14 11 12 10 11 13 12 9 13 
(i) Linking 
student and 
teacher data to 
preparation 
programs 
7 7 7 6 6 7 5 6 5 6 5 7 6 6 6 7 6 6 5 6 
(ii) Expansion of 
successful 
preparation 
programs 
7 6 7 6 6 5 4 6 5 5 6 7 5 6 4 4 7 6 4 6 
(D)(5) Providing 
effective support 
to teachers and 
principals 
20 17 18 19 18 18 14 19 19 17 19 18 17 14 12 16 15 17 14 18 
(i) Providing 
effective, data-
informed 
professional 
development 
10 9 9 9 9 9 7 9 10 9 10 9 9 7 6 8 9 8 9 9 
(ii) Measuring, 
evaluating, and 
continually 
improving 
supports 
10 8 9 10 9 9 7 10 9 9 9 9 8 7 6 8 6 9 5 9 
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E. Turning 
Around the 
Lowest-
Achieving 
Schools 
50 50 48 48 47 46 48 46 48 46 45 49 47 45 46 46 46 43 44 45 
(E)(1) Intervening 
in the lowest-
achieving schools 
and LEAs 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 
(E)(2) Turning 
around the 
lowest-achieving 
schools 
40 40 38 38 37 36 38 36 38 36 35 39 37 40 36 36 36 33 34 35 
(i) Identifying the 
persistently 
lowest-achieving 
schools 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
(ii) Turning 
around the 
persistently 
lowest-achieving 
schools 
35 35 33 33 32 31 33 31 33 32 30 34 32 35 31 31 31 28 29 30 
F. General 55 50 50 48 53 52 53 41 46 43 45 45 50 48 46 45 52 52 46 21 
(F)(1) Making 
education funding 
a priority 
10 10 10 10 9 10 10 8 10 9 10 3 9 10 10 10 9 10 9 8 
(i) Revenues to 
support education 
5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
(ii) State funding 
policies lead to 
equitable funding 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 3 
(F)(2) Ensuring 
successful 
conditions for 
high-performing 
charter schools 
40 35 36 34 39 38 39 28 33 30 31 37 36 36 32 30 39 38 32 8 
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and other 
innovative 
schools 
(i) Charter school 
law does not 
prohibit or inhibit 
charter schools 
8 4 5 8 8 8 8 4 8 2 6 8 8 8 8 5 8 8 8 0 
(ii) Laws 
regarding 
approval, 
monitoring, and 
accountability 
8 8 8 8 8 7 8 4 8 8 6 8 8 7 7 7 8 7 5 0 
(iii) Equitable 
funding for 
charter schools 
8 7 7 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 6 7 8 8 8 0 
(iv) Charter 
funding for 
facilities 
8 8 8 7 8 7 8 6 6 5 3 8 7 7 3 8 8 8 8 0 
(v) Innovative, 
autonomous 
public schools 
8 8 8 5 8 8 8 6 3 7 7 6 6 7 7 4 7 7 3 8 
(F)(3) 
Demonstrating 
other significant 
reform conditions 
5 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 3 5 5 5 4 5 5 
Competitive 
Preference 
Priority 2: 
Emphasis on 
STEM 
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Total 500 471 465 462 452 451 450 450 446 442 441 438 435 434 431 427 424 420 418 412 
   Source: U.S. Department of Education 
